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Abstract – In most studies regarding evolutionary game dynamics, the effective payoff, a quantity
that translates the payoff derived from game interactions into reproductive success, is usually
assumed to be a specific function of the payoff. Meanwhile, the effect of different function forms
of effective payoff on evolutionary dynamics is always left in the basket. With introducing a
generalized mapping that the effective payoff of individuals is a non-negative function of two
variables on selection intensity and payoff, we study how different effective payoff functions affect
evolutionary dynamics in a symmetrical mutation-selection process. For standard two-strategy
two-player games, we find that under weak selection the condition for one strategy to dominate
the other depends not only on the classical σ-rule, but also on an extra constant that is determined
by the form of the effective payoff function. By changing the sign of the constant, we can alter
the direction of strategy selection. Taking the Moran process and pairwise comparison process as
specific models in well-mixed populations, we find that different fitness or imitation mappings are
equivalent under weak selection. Moreover, the sign of the extra constant determines the direction
of one-third law and risk-dominance for sufficiently large populations. This work thus helps to
elucidate how the effective payoff function as another fundamental ingredient of evolution affect
evolutionary dynamics.
Introduction. – In a Darwinian evolutionary pro-
cess, it mainly incorporates three fundamental ingredi-
ents: inheritance, mutation, and selection. Due to the
influence of perturbation or random drift, a genetic pro-
cess frequently accompanies the occurrence of mutations,
which creates genotypic or phenotypic variation, thereby
finally leading to the differences in individual fitness that
selection acts upon [1]. By integrating game theory with
Darwinian evolution [2, 3], evolutionary game theory has
become a powerful mathematical framework to model bi-
ological [4, 5] and social [6–9] evolution in a population
consisting of different types of interacting individuals un-
der frequency-dependent selection.
Traditionally, a widely used system that focuses on
the effects of frequency-dependent selection is the repli-
cator equation [10, 11], where the population is infinitely
large well-mixed and the stochastic effect is exclusively
overlooked usually. However, if we relax this setting to
a more realistic situation where the population is finite
well-mixed and subject to fluctuations, this determin-
istic approach is augmented and disturbed by random
drift [12–14]. In such a finite population with fluctua-
tions, it needs to resort to the tool of stochastic evolu-
tionary game dynamics for investigating the evolution of
different traits [1,15]. In addition to the classical Wright-
Fisher process [12, 16], frequency-dependent Moran pro-
cess [13,15], and imitation-based pairwise comparison pro-
cess [17–19] are two most common microscopic models of
strategy spreading in finite populations. In contrast to
the well-mixed population setting above, there are also
lots of interest in studying evolutionary game dynamics in
structured populations [17, 20–22]. Typically, the spatial
geometry of population structure is modeled by regular
lattices [23–28] or more general complex networks [29–32],
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where individual interactions merely occur among nearest
neighbors.
For a game system, in general, the ingredients influenc-
ing the final evolutionary outcomes are nothing but the
model, update rule, mutation rate, and population struc-
ture, etc. Models and update rules determine the way
of strategy spreading. Mutation rates measure the in-
tensity of randomness, while the underlying population
structure describes the geometry of individual interac-
tions. Depending on the game interactions, each indi-
vidual obtains a payoff, and finally it needs to trans-
late into reproductive success, termed effective payoff [33].
For example, the effective payoff is known as fitness in
Moran process [13, 15] and imitation probability in pair-
wise comparison process [18, 19, 34]. Based on the usual
assumption that the effective payoff is the form of 1 +
(Selection intensity) · (Payoff), for standard two-strategy
two-player games, Tarnita et al. demonstrate that if the
selection intensity is weak the condition for one strategy
to dominate the other is determined by a ‘σ-rule’ [33],
which holds on any population structure [35]. The pa-
rameter σ, termed structure coefficient, is a quantity that
only depends on the population structure, update rule,
and mutation rate, but not on the payoff values. Later,
this work attracts wide interest [36–38]. For two-player
games with multiple strategies, it involves two structure
coefficients [36]. To calculate them, investigating games
with three strategies is enough. While for multi-player
games with two strategies where d individuals are selected
to play a game, the σ-rule will depend on d− 1 structure
coefficients [37]. In particular, for a more general setting
of multi-player games with many strategies, this rule turns
out to be quite complicated and the number of structure
coefficients required for a symmetric game with d-player
and n-strategy grows in d like dn−1 [38]. Clearly, because
the form of the effective payoff is a specific function in
these works, the σ-rule does not reflect the influence of
the effective payoff function on evolutionary outcomes.
In evolutionary biology, however, how to measure the
genotype-fitness map (i.e., the fitness landscape) is always
a challenging issue, and now it has been accepted that
the shape of the genotype-fitness map has fundamental
effects on the course of evolution [39]. In addition, based
on a Markov chain model, it has been demonstrated that
the heterogeneity of individual background fitness can act
as a suppressor of selection [40]. In a way, therefore, it
means that the form of the effective payoff function (which
translates the payoff derived from game interactions into
the ability of reproductive success) has a significant effect
on the evolution of game dynamics.
To this end, in this letter we study the effect of different
function forms of effective payoff on evolutionary dynam-
ics and accordingly extend the results given by Tarnita
et al. [33]. We find that if the first-order derivative of
the effective payoff function can be written by a linear
combination of payoff, then the condition for one strat-
egy to dominate the other depends not only on the σ-rule,
but also on an extra constant which is determined by the
effective payoff function. This constant determines the
direction of σ-rule (strategy selection). Additionally, tak-
ing the Moran process and pairwise comparison process as
specific models in well-mixed populations, we demonstrate
that different fitness or imitation mappings are equivalent
under weak selection and the extra constant curbs the di-
rection of one-third law and risk-dominance in the limit of
large populations.
Model and results. – In a structured population
with N individuals, we consider stochastic evolutionary
dynamics induced by a mutation-selection process. Each
player can choose an arbitrary strategy from A and B.
Then, depending on the payoff matrix
(A B
A a b
B c d
)
, (1)
players obtain an accumulative payoff by interacting with
other individuals based on the underlying population
structure. For example, when an A player interacts with
another A player, it will obtain a payoff a, but b when in-
teracting with a B player. Likewise, a B player can obtain
a payoff c when interacting with an A player, and payoff
d when interacting with another B player. Therefore, the
total payoff of each player is a linear function of a, b, c, and
d without including constant terms (evidently, if the pay-
off is calculated in an average way, the linear relation also
holds). For an A player, for instance, the total payoff is
a · (number of A-neighbors)+ b · (number of B -neighbors).
To study the effect of effective payoff functions on evo-
lutionary dynamics, instead of a specific form, we as-
sume that the effective payoff of a player is given by
ϕ(β,Payoff). Parameter β measures the intensity of se-
lection, and β → 0 corresponds to the case of weak selec-
tion [13, 19, 41].
The reproductive process of each player is dependent
on the update rule and its effective payoff, and subject
to mutations. With probability µ, a mutation occurs and
the offspring adopts a strategy (A or B) at random. Oth-
erwise, with probability 1 − µ, the offspring inherits its
parent’s strategy. For µ = 1, there are only mutations,
no selection, and strategy choice is completely random.
If 0 < µ < 1, however, there exists a mutation-selection
equilibrium [42,43].
For the game of two strategies, the frequency of A play-
ers in the population defines a finite state space, S, and the
evolutionary dynamics can be captured by a Markov pro-
cess on this state space. We denote the transition proba-
bility from state Si to state Sj by Pij . Since the transition
probability depends on the update rule and on the effec-
tive payoff of players, it can be given by Pij [ϕ(β,Payoff)].
Furthermore, we assume that ϕ(β,Payoff) is differentiable
at β = 0. In the limit of weak selection, then we can
give ϕ(β,Payoff) in the form of first-order Taylor ex-
pansions, ϕ(β,Payoff) = ϕ0 + ϕ
(1)(0) · β + o(β). Here
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ϕ0 := ϕ(0,Payoff) represents the baseline effective pay-
off of each player, and ϕ(1)(0) := [∂ϕ(β,Payoff)/∂β]β=0
represents the first-order coefficient of selection intensity.
Particularly, if ϕ(1)(0) can be written by a linear combina-
tion of payoff, that is ϕ(1)(0) = [∂ϕ(β,Payoff)/∂β]β=0 =
k0 · Payoff + c0, then the transition probability is given
by Pij [ϕ0 + (k0 · Payoff + c0)β + o(β)]. Clearly, the con-
stants, k0 and c0, are dependent on the choice of the
function ϕ(β,Payoff) and may rely on the entries of the
payoff matrix. In addition, actually a large body of
functions meet the condition ϕ(1)(0) = k0 · Payoff + c0,
such as 1 − β + β · Payoff [13], exp(β · Payoff) [37], and
ϕ(β ·Payoff) [19]. Therefore, this condition is not a harsh
requirement. Note that the payoff of players is linear in
a, b, c, and d without constant terms, it follows that the
transition probability is the function Pij [(k0a+c0)β, (k0b+
c0)β, (k0c + c0)β, (k0d + c0)β]. Then, based on the nota-
tion (a′, b′, c′, d′) := (k0a+ c0, k0b+ c0, k0c+ c0, k0d+ c0)
and following the proof given in Ref. [33], we know that
the condition that strategy A is favored over strategy B
(i.e., strategy A is more abundant than B in the mutation-
selection equilibrium) is σa′ + b′ > c′ + σd′, where σ is a
parameter that depends on the population structure, up-
date rule, and mutation rate. Accordingly, we have the
following theorem:
Theorem 1. Consider a population structure and an up-
date rule that satisfy the following three conditions: (i)
the transition probabilities are differentiable at β = 0;
(ii) the update rule is symmetric for the two strategies
A and B; and (iii) in the game given by the matrix
entries, a = c = d = 0 and b = 1, strategy A is
not disfavored. Then, in the limit of weak selection,
when the effective payoff function ϕ(β,Payoff) satisfies
[∂ϕ(β,Payoff)/∂β]β=0 = k0 · Payoff + c0, strategy A is
favored over strategy B if k0(σa+ b− c− σd) > 0, where
k0 is a constant that relies on the function of the effective
payoff, and σ is the structure coefficient which depends on
the model and the dynamics (population structure, up-
date rule, and mutation rate), but not on the entries of
the payoff matrix.
This theorem implies that for determining the condi-
tion under which one strategy dominates the other, the
classical σ-rule [33] is not enough. It also depends on an
additional constant k0 determined by the effective payoff
function. Actually, the constant k0 controls the direction
of σ-rule (strategy selection). If the effective payoff func-
tion is given such that the constant k0 is positive, the
theorem recovers the classical σ-rule (selection favors A to
dominate B). Otherwise, if the effective payoff function
is given such that k0 is negative, the classical σ-rule will
reverse the direction (selection favors B to dominate A).
Moran and pairwise comparison process. – To
check the validity of our theorem and to study how the
effective payoff function influences the evolutionary out-
comes in a specific dynamic process, here we consider the
frequency-dependent Moran process and pairwise compar-
ison process. These two processes represent two classes of
typical evolutionary dynamics. The former describes how
successful strategies spread in the population through ge-
netic reproduction, whereas the latter describes such a
process through cultural imitation.
In the Moran process, the effective payoff is known as
the individual fitness, which measures the ability to sur-
vive and produce offspring. With a probability propor-
tional to the fitness, an individual is selected randomly
for reproduction. And then one identical offspring re-
places another randomly chosen individual. Usually, the
fitness is assumed to be a convex combination of a back-
ground fitness (which is set to one) and the payoff from
the game [13,15], or an exponential function of payoff [37].
Under these specific forms, the constant k0 related to the
fitness function actually turns to 1 and it reduces to the
previous results [13,18]. Instead of using a specific fitness
form, here we adopt a generalized mapping that the fitness
of a player is any a non-negative function of two variables
on selection intensity and payoff, f(β,Payoff). Since mu-
tation occurs during the process of reproduction, it follows
that the transition probabilities are given by
Pi,i+1 =
if(β, piA)(1− µ) + (N − i)f(β, piB)µ
if(β, piA) + (N − i)f(β, piB)
N − i
N
,
Pi,i−1 =
(N − i)f(β, piB)(1− µ) + if(β, piA)µ
if(β, piA) + (N − i)f(β, piB)
i
N
,
(2)
where piA(i) := [a(i− 1)+ b(N − i)]/(N − 1) and piB(i) :=
[ci + d(N − i − 1)]/(N − 1) are the average payoffs of an
A player and a B player, respectively.
While in the pairwise comparison process, the effective
payoff is known as the imitation probability. Two individ-
uals are sampled randomly and then a focal player imitates
the strategy of the role model with a probability depending
on the payoff comparison [18, 43]. As usual, the imitation
probability is modeled by the Fermi function with consid-
ering the effect of noise [17, 24, 25]. Thus, this process is
also called Fermi process. Under the situation that the
effective payoff mapping is non-specified, however, the im-
itation probability function for the pairwise comparison
process should be given by g(β,∆pi). Here, ∆pi denotes
the difference of average payoffs between strategy A and
B. In the presence of mutations, this imitation process
occurs accurately with probability 1−µ. Otherwise, with
probability µ, the focal player adopts a random strategy,
A or B. Then, it leads to the transition probabilities,
Pi,i+1 = (1− µ)
i
N
N − i
N
g(β,∆pi(i)) +
N − i
N
µ
2
,
Pi,i−1 = (1− µ)
i
N
N − i
N
g(β,−∆pi(i)) +
i
N
µ
2
,
(3)
where ∆pi(i) := piA(i)−piB(i) = ui+v. Herein, parameters
u and v are defined by u := (a − b − c + d)/(N − 1) and
v := (Nb −Nd− a+ d)/(N − 1), respectively.
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Moreover, for both processes, the probability to stay in
the current state is 1−Pi,i+1−Pi,i−1, and the probability
to transform to other states is vanishing. In what follows,
we first calculate the fixation probabilities and fixation
times under weak selection when mutations are absent.
Then, we derive the criterion that strategy A is favored
over strategy B in this case, and finally extrapolate this
criterion to small mutation rates.
Fixation probabilities and fixation times. If there are
no mutations in these two game systems, then one quan-
tity of most interest is the fixation probability, φi, which
describes the probability that i individuals of type A reach
fixation at all A. Another significant quantity is the av-
erage time for a single A player reaching fixation [44–46].
The former measures the preference of natural selection
whereas the latter characterizes the evolutionary velocity
of the system.
First, we follow the conditions given by Theorem 1,
that is, the first-order derivative of fitness function for the
Moran process can be written by fβ(0, pi) = k
(m)
0 ·pi+c
(m)
0 ,
and the one of imitation probability function for the pair-
wise comparison process can be written by gβ(0,∆pi) =
k
(p)
0 ·∆pi+c
(p)
0 . Here, k
(m)
0 and c
(m)
0 (k
(p)
0 and c
(p)
0 ) are two
constants that depend on the choice of fitness (imitation
probability) functions and may be related to the entries
of the payoff matrix. With the notations m0 := k
(m)
0 /f0
and p0 := 2k
(p)
0 /g0 = k
(p)
0 /g
2
0 , where f0 = f(0, pi) is the
baseline fitness of each player and g0 = g(0,∆pi) = 1/2
is the probability of random imitation, we obtain the ap-
proximation of fixation probabilities under weak selection
(details for the Supplementary Material) as
φi ≈
i
N
+ β · s ·
i(N − i)[(N + i)u+ 3v]
6N
, (4)
where s = m0 for the frequency-dependent Moran process,
and s = p0 for the pairwise comparison process.
While for the average times of a single A player reach-
ing fixation, there are two kinds of fixation times that
attract much research attention [18, 44]. The first one is
the unconditional average time of fixation t1, which is the
expected value for the time until the population reaches
one of the two absorbing states, all A and all B, when
starting from a single A. Another is the conditional aver-
age time of fixation tA1 , which specifies the expected time
that a player of type A takes to reach the absorbing state,
all A. In the limit of weak selection, we find that the un-
conditional and conditional fixation times for the Moran
process (details for the Supplementary Material) can be
approximated to
t1 ≈ NHN−1 +m0v
N
2
(N + 1− 2HN )β,
tA1 ≈ N(N − 1)−m0u
N2(N2 − 3N + 2)
36
β,
(5)
whereas for the pairwise comparison process, they are
given by
t1 ≈ 2NHN−1 + p0vN(N − 1−HN−1)β,
tA1 ≈ 2N(N − 1)− p0uN(N − 1)
N2 +N − 6
18
β,
(6)
where HN =
∑N
l=1
1
l
is the harmonic number.
Interestingly, for both Moran process and pairwise com-
parison process, if the first-order derivative of the effective
payoff function (i.e., the fitness and imitation probabil-
ity function) can be written by a linear combination of
the payoff, the difference in the influence of effective pay-
off functions on evolutionary outcomes just embodies in
the coefficients before selection intensity, m0 and p0. By
proper rescaling, actually, these constant coefficients can
be absorbed into the selection intensity, or make all payoff
matrix entries (a, b, c, and d) change a scale in view of
the exact formulae of u and v. In particular, if we adopt
a linear or an exponential form of payoff as the fitness
function, or the Fermi function as the imitation probabil-
ity, both m0 and p0 are 1, which recovers the previous
results [18] as specific cases. Moreover, under the condi-
tions [(N +1)u+3v] > 0 and u > 0, if a fitness (imitation
probability) function is chosen such that m0 > 0 (p0 > 0),
then taking the constant 1 as the benchmark, m0 > 1
(p0 > 1) leads this function to acting as an amplifier of
selection (facilitating the fixation of advantage individu-
als and decreasing the fixation time). Nevertheless, when
m0 < 1 (p0 < 1), this function acts as a suppressor of se-
lection (suppressing the fixation of advantage individuals
and increasing the fixation time). This result holds not
only for weak selection, but also for intermediate selection
intensity (see Fig. 1). As the counterpart, if the function is
chosen such that m0 < 0 (p0 < 0), with the scaling theory
of dilemma strength [47,48], another example of prisoner’s
dilemma is given in the Supplementary Material.
Equivalence. Based on the above calculations of fix-
ation probabilities and fixation times under weak selec-
tion, additionally, we find that two arbitrary fitness (im-
itation probability) functions in a Moran process (pair-
wise comparison process) are equivalent. Specifically, for
the frequency-dependent Moran process with a general-
ized fitness function f(β, pi), if fβ(0, pi) = k
(m)
0 ·pi+ c
(m)
0 is
satisfied, we know that the influence of any two different
fitness functions on evolutionary outcomes just embodies
in the constant factor m0 before the selection intensity.
Thus, in this sense, any two fitness mappings meeting the
conditions defined above are equivalent under weak selec-
tion. The equivalence means that the difference in fixation
probabilities and fixation times is merely captured by the
constant factor m0, with which the payoff matrix or the
intensity of selection changes a scale.
Particularly, if the fitness function adopts one of the
function families, F1(β, pi) =
∑m
j=0 ajβ
j +
∑n
i=1 bi(βpi)
i
and F2(β, pi) =
∑m
j=0 ajβ
j +
∑n
i=1 biβ
ipi (m,n =
1, 2, 3, ...), where aj and bi are constant coefficients that
guarantee F1 > 0 and F2 > 0 because the individual
p-4
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fitness is positive [19, 37], then we have the same factor
m0 = b1/a0. Interestingly, if m0 = b1/a0 = 1, these two
function families are equivalent to the prevalent fitness
mappings 1 − β + βpi and exp(βpi) under weak selection
(see Fig. 2). Actually, the Taylor series of exp(βpi) at
β = 0 is just the function family F1 when specific coeffi-
cients a0 = 1, aj = 0 (j > 0), and bi = 1/(i!) are applied.
Similarly, for the pairwise comparison process with
a generalized imitation probability function g(β,∆pi), if
gβ(0,∆pi) = k
(p)
0 · ∆pi + c
(p)
0 is satisfied, then the influ-
ence of any two different imitation probability functions
on evolutionary outcomes also embodies in a constant fac-
tor before the selection intensity, p0. Thus, in this sense,
for two arbitrary imitation probability functions, they are
also equivalent under weak selection. The equivalence fol-
lows the same meaning as that in the Moran process, that
is, the constant factor p0 uniquely measures the difference
of fixation probabilities and fixation times under weak se-
lection.
Surprisingly, with a completely similar formula-
tion to the fitness function families F1 and F2,
G1(β,∆pi) =
∑m
j=0 αjβ
j +
∑n
i=1 ηi(β∆pi)
i and
G2(β,∆pi) =
∑m
j=0 αjβ
j +
∑n
i=1 ηiβ
i∆pi (m,n =
1, 2, 3, ...), where αj and ηi are constant coefficients which
guarantee that G1 and G2 are probability functions
and α0 = 1/2, are two classes of equivalent imitation
probability functions. Particularly, if η1 = 1/4, these
two function families are equivalent to the popular Fermi
function 1/(1 + e−β∆pi) under weak selection (see Fig. 2).
Actually, by choosing specific coefficients, G1 can also
become the Taylor series of Fermi function at β = 0.
One-third law and risk-dominance. In stochastic evo-
lutionary game dynamics, the notions of invasion and fixa-
tion are two fundamental concepts to describe the spread-
ing of strategies in finite populations [13, 15]. Using the
neutral game as the benchmark, strategy A is shortly
said to fixate in a resident population (selection favors
A replacing B) if the fixation probability for a single A
is larger than that in the neutral game [13, 15]. Thus,
for the frequency-dependent Moran process with a fit-
ness function f(β, pi) which fulfills the condition given
above, selection favors A replacing B under weak selec-
tion if m0[(N + 1)u + 3v] > 0 (see Eq. (4)). Similarly,
for the pairwise comparison process with an imitation
probability function g(β,∆pi), selection favors A replac-
ing B under weak selection if p0[(N + 1)u + 3v] > 0 (see
Eq. (4)). In view of the notations m0 := k
(m)
0 /f0 and
p0 := 2k
(p)
0 /g0 = k
(p)
0 /g
2
0, it follows that the criterion
that selection favors A replacing B under weak selection
is k0[(N + 1)u + 3v] > 0, where k0 = k
(m)
0 for the Moran
process and k0 = k
(p)
0 for the pairwise comparison pro-
cess. Specifically, we have (see Fig. 3): (i) When k0 > 0,
the condition under which selection favors A replacing B
(φ1 > 1/N) is a(N−2)+b(2N−1) > c(N+1)+d(2N−4).
Particularly, for sufficiently large population size N →
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
Fig. 1: Effect of fitness and imitation probability functions
on evolutionary dynamics acts as a selection amplifier or sup-
pressor. Using the payoff matrix entries, a = 1.2, b = 0.8,
c = 1.0, and d = 0.7 (i.e., A dominates B), we show the fix-
ation probabilities and conditional fixation times of a single
A when population size is N = 100 in Moran process (panel
(a) and (b)) and pairwise comparison process (panel (c) and
(d)), respectively. Lines are analytical results (Eqs. (S9) and
(S14) in the Supplementary Material), while symbols are sim-
ulations. If a fitness function is applied such that m0 > 1 ((a)
and (b)) or an imitation probability function such that p0 > 1
((c) and (d)), it promotes the fixation of advantage strategy
and decreases the fixation time (red lines) compared with the
benchmarkm0 = 1 or p0 = 1 (blue lines). Otherwise, ifm0 < 1
or p0 < 1, it suppresses the fixation of advantage strategy and
increases the fixation time (purple lines) compared with the
benchmark (blue lines).
+∞, it corresponds to one-third law [13] in the case of co-
ordination games (1/3 > (d−b)/(a−b−c+d)); (ii) When
k0 < 0, this condition changes to a(N − 2) + b(2N − 1) <
c(N+1)+d(2N−4). Particularly, for N → +∞, the clas-
sical one-third law is reversed in the case of coordination
games (1/3 < (d−b)/(a−b−c+d)); (iii) When k0 = 0, the
condition that selection favors A replacing B will depend
on the higher order coefficients of β in φ1. Actually, the
calculations of higher order coefficients under weak selec-
tion are more tedious than the linear approximation [19].
Except for the underlying principle that determines the
condition of favoring strategy A to replace B, it is also of
interest to ask whether strategy A is selected over strategy
B, termed ‘strategy selection’ [33]. First, let ρA (ρB) de-
notes the fixation probability that a single individual using
strategy A (B) invades and takes over a resident popula-
tion of B (A) players. Accordingly, we have ρA = φ1.
Moreover, note that the probability ρB is equal to that
N − 1 individuals of type A fail to take over a popula-
tion in which there is just a single B individual. Then,
it leads to ρB = 1 − φN−1. With introducing the nota-
tion γj = Pj,j−1/Pj,j+1, which is the ratio of transition
p-5
Feng Huang1 Xiaojie Chen2 Long Wang1,*
0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.010
0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
300
350
400
450
500
550
0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
650
700
750
800
850
900
950
1000
1050
0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
8000
8400
8800
9200
9600
10000
0.000 0.002 0.004 0.006 0.008 0.010
15000
15600
16200
16800
17400
18000
18600
19200
19800 (f)(e)
(c)(b)
(d)
Fi
xa
tio
n 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
, 
 1- +
 1+
 1+ +( )2
 1+ + 2
 e
 Aprroximation
(a)
Fi
xa
tio
n 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
, 
Selection intensity, 
 1/(1+e- )
 1/2+ /4
 1/2+ /4+200 2
 1/2+ /4+100( )2
 Approximation
U
nc
on
di
tio
na
l f
ix
at
io
n 
tim
e,
 t 1
 1- +
 1+
 1+ +( )2
 1+ + 2
 e
 Aprroximation
U
nc
on
di
tio
na
l f
ix
at
io
n 
tim
e,
 t 1
Selection intensity, 
 1/(1+e- )
 1/2+ /4
 1/2+ /4+200 2
 1/2+ /4+100( )2
 Approximation
Co
nd
iti
on
al
 fi
xa
tio
n 
tim
e,
 tA 1
 1- +
 1+
 1+ +( )2
 1+ + 2
 e
 Aprroximation
Co
nd
iti
on
al
 fi
xa
tio
n 
tim
e,
 tA 1
Selection intensity, 
 1/(1+e- )
 1/2+ /4
 1/2+ /4+200 2
 1/2+ /4+100( )2
 Approximation
Fig. 2: Equivalence of Moran process and pairwise comparison
process under weak selection. In the first row, we show the
fixation probability φ1 (a), unconditional fixation time t1 (b),
and conditional fixation time tA1 (c) of a single mutant A in
Moran process, respectively. The exact analytical results are
depicted by solid lines with symbols, and accordingly we show
the weak selection approximations by short dash dots, based
on a class of equivalent fitness functions. The same manipula-
tion is repeated for pairwise comparison process with a class of
equivalent imitation probability functions, as shown in the sec-
ond row. Analytical results are numerical calculations on the
basis of exact Eqs. (S9), (S12), and (S14) in the Supplemen-
tary Material, but weak selection approximations are based on
Eqs. (4)–(6). Parameters are N = 100, a = 4, b = 1, c = 1,
and d = 5 (coordination games) in all panels. (These results
are also valid for dominance and coexistence games.)
probabilities when mutations are absent (µ = 0), we have
the ratio of fixation probabilities for strategy A and B as
ρB/ρA =
∏N−1
j=1 γj . Under weak selection, the ratio of
these two fixation probabilities can be approximated to
ρB/ρA ≈ 1− sβ
N−1∑
j=1
(uj + v)
= 1−
sβ
2
[a(N − 2) + bN − cN − d(N − 2)],
(7)
where s = m0 for the Moran process, and s = p0 for
the pairwise comparison process. In view of the def-
initions of m0 and p0, therefore, the condition under
which strategy A is selected over strategy B is given
by k0(σa + b − c − σd) > 0, where k0 = k
(m)
0 for the
Moran process and k0 = k
(p)
0 for the pairwise compari-
son process, and σ = (N − 2)/N is the structure coeffi-
cient of well-mixed populations [33]. Under weak selec-
tion, specifically we have (see Fig. 3): (i) When k0 > 0,
the condition that strategy A is selected over strategy B
is σa + b > c + σd. Particularly, for sufficiently large
population size N → +∞, it corresponds to that A is
risk-dominant in the case of coordination games (1/2 >
(d − b)/(a− b − c+ d)); (ii) When k0 < 0, this condition
changes to σa+ b < c+ σd. Particularly, for N → +∞, it
corresponds to that B is risk-dominant in the case of co-
ordination games (1/2 < (d−b)/(a−b−c+d)); (iii) When
k0 = 0, the condition that strategy A is selected over strat-
egy B under weak selection will depend on higher order
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Fig. 3: Direction of the one-third law and the risk dominance
is determined by the choice of fitness and imitation probabil-
ity functions. When k
(m)
0 > 0 for Moran process or k
(p)
0 > 0
for pairwise comparison process, it corresponds to the classi-
cal one-third law and risk-dominance in coordination games
(a). While if k
(m)
0 < 0 for Moran process or k
(p)
0 < 0 for pair-
wise comparison process, the direction of one-third law and
risk-dominance is reversed (b). Otherwise, the conditions de-
termining ρA > 1/N or ρA > ρB under weak selection will
depend on higher order coefficients of fixation probabilities.
coefficients of β in ρB/ρA.
In particular, if we additionally consider the situation
where small non-uniform mutations occur between the two
strategies, that strategy A is more abundant than B in
the long run is determined by µABρB/µBAρA < 1 [42,
44, 49], where µAB and µBA denote the mutation rates
from A to B and from B to A, respectively. For µAB =
µBA, clearly the conclusions obtained above are still valid,
which extrapolates our results to the situation of small
mutations.
Discussion. – Most previous studies exclusively as-
sume that the effective payoff function is a specific form.
One direct result of this setting is that the final evolution-
ary outcomes do not reflect the effect of the effective payoff
function on evolutionary dynamics. Therefore, it still re-
mains unclear how the effective payoff function influences
the evolutionary dynamics in a game system. With intro-
ducing a generalized mapping, we investigate such effect
in this letter.
For standard 2 × 2 games where a specific form of the
effective payoff is adopted, it has been demonstrated that
under weak selection the condition for one strategy to
dominate the other is determined by a σ-rule [33]. This
rule almost captures all aspects of evolutionary dynam-
ics, but ignores the effect of the effective payoff function.
Particularly, if the effective payoff function is an any non-
negative mapping of the product of the payoff and the
selection intensity [19,37], the rule still holds. But it does
not change the basic fact that the role played by the ef-
fective payoff function in evolutionary game dynamics is
exclusively overlooked. With introducing a more gener-
alized mapping that the effective payoff of individuals is
a function of payoff and selection intensity, however, we
find that the condition determining a strategy to be se-
lected relies not only on the σ-rule, but also on an extra
constant which characterizes and depends on the effective
payoff function. As an extension, a multi-strategy version
is also given in the Supplementary Material.
Based on specific effective payoff forms, it has been
found that the linear and exponential functions lead to
identical evolutionary outcomes under weak selection [19,
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37, 43]. Here we generalize this equivalence understand-
ing to any two fitness functions in a Moran process, and
imitation probability functions in a pairwise comparison
process. In addition, except for the standard 2× 2 games
and weak selection, there are lots of research interest in
the games of multiple players or strategies [36,37,50] and
strong selection [51], which are worth the effort in the fu-
ture.
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